wireless devices to create and dissolve the ad-hoc network conveniently. It is useful in allowing quick setting-up of a wireless network among end users.
Figure 1 Ad-hoc Mode
As noted in the 1999 edition of the 802.11 specifications [2] , "The principal distinguishing characteristic of an ad hoc network is its limited temporal and spatial extent." To achieve a more permanent wireless network, with larger communication range, infrastructure modes (see below) are often used.
2) Basic Service Set (BSS):
A BSS is "a set of stations controlled by a single coordination function". [2] A BSS (commonly referred to as an infrastructure network) consists of a single access point and a number of end nodes as shown in Figure 2 . All the communication between any two nodes has to pass through the AP. The coverage area is greatly increased as compared to an IBSS.
Mobile nodes A, B and C, for example, cannot communicate with each other via ad-hoc mode, because they are outside each other's communication range. However, by communicating through the access point, they effectively form a WLAN for data communications. The access point behaves in a way similar to a hub in a star topology network.
Figure 2. Basic Service Set

3) Extended Service Set (ESS):
An ESS is "a set of one or more interconnected basic service sets (BSSs) and integrated local area networks (LANs) that appears as a single BSS to the logical link control layer at any station associated with one of those BSSs". [2] As shown in Figure 3 , an ESS consists of multiple BSSs each having a single access point.
The access point in each BSS is connected to a distribution system that is usually a wired Ethernet network. An ESS is a hybrid of wireless and wired LANs, and extends a wireless station's connectivity beyond its local access point.
Figure 3. Extended Service Set (ESS)
With the exception of ad-hoc wireless networks, a WLAN typically consists of a central connection point called the Access Point (AP), which transmits data between different nodes of a WLAN and, in most cases, serves as the only link between the WLAN and the wired networks.
The IEEE802.11 Protocols and Built-In Security Features
Between 1997 and 2001, the IEEE had released a series of 802.11 WLAN standards [3] , some of which are summarized in Table 1 There also exist several on-going task groups working on developing protocols related to the performance and/or security of 802.11 protocols, such as 802.11e, and 802.11i. The standards and drafts are available on line from the IEEE web site 1 .
• 802.11e (QoS for 802.11): The goal of the IEEE 802.11e task group is to enhance the 802.11
Medium Access Control (MAC) layer, in order to improve and manage quality of service (QoS), and to enhance security and authentication mechanisms. These enhancements should provide the quality required for services such as IP telephony and video streaming.
• 3) MAC Address Filtering: In this scheme, the AP is configured to accept association and connection requests from only those nodes whose MAC addresses are registered with the AP.
Association and/or connection requests sent by other wireless devices will be rejected.
Although an unrealistic protection method in an enterprise network environment, MAC address filtering can be an effective method in smaller networks at homes or small businesses.
WLANs Vulnerabilities
Ubiquitous network access without wires is the main attraction underlying wireless network deployment. Although this seems to be enough attraction, there exists other side of the picture. In this section, we discuss how WLANs could be vulnerable to a myriad of intrusion methods.
General Wireless Network Vulnerabilities
All wireless networks share a unique difference from their wired counterparts, i.e., its use of radio as transmission medium, which contributes to a unique vulnerability, 'Lack of Physical • Invasion & Resource Stealing: Resources in a network include access to various devices (such as printers and servers) and services (such as connectivity to an intranet or the Internet).
To invade a network, the attacker will first try to determine the access parameters for that particular network. Hacking techniques such as MAC spoofing may be used to attack a WLAN [4] [5] . For example, if the underlying network uses MAC-address-based filtering of clients, all an intruder has to do is to find out the MAC address and the assigned IP address for a particular client. The intruder will wait till that client goes off the network and then start using the network and its resources, appearing as a valid user.
• Traffic Redirection: An intruder can change the route of the traffic, causing packets destined for a particular computer to be redirected to the attacking station.
• Denial of Service (DOS): Two types of DOS attacks against a WLAN can exist. In the first case, the intruder tries to bring the network to its knees by causing excessive interference. An example could be excessive radio interference caused by 2.4 GHz cordless phones [6] . A more focused DOS attack would be when an attacking station sends 802.11 disassociate message or replays a previously-captured 802.1x EAPOL-logoff message 4 to the target station and effectively disconnects it (as in "Session Hijack" attacks). The later type of DOS attack is described in more details in section 5.4, when we discuss the IEEE 802.11i protocol.
• Rogue Access Points: A rogue AP is one that is installed by an attacker (usually in public areas like shared office space, airports, etc.) to accept traffic from wireless clients to whom it appears as a valid Authenticator. Packets thus captured can be used to extract sensitive information, or for launching further attacks by, for example, modifying the content of the captured packet and re-insert it into the network.
IEEE 802.11 Vulnerabilities
The above stated concerns relate to wireless networks in general. Some of the security concerns raised specifically against IEEE 802.11 networks are as follow [7] .
• MAC Address Authentication: Such sort of authentication establishes the identity of the physical machine, not its human user. Thus an attacker who manages to steal a laptop with a 4 EAPOL, EAP over LAN, is a standard for encapsulating EAP messages.
registered MAC address will appear to the network as a legitimate user.
• One-way Authentication: WEP authentication is client-centered or one-way only. This means that the client has to prove its identity to the AP but not vice versa. Thus a rogue AP may successfully authenticate the client station and then subsequently will be able to capture all the packets sent by that station through it.
• Static WEP Keys: There is no concept of dynamic or per-session WEP keys in 802.11
specifications. Moreover the same WEP key has to be manually entered at all the stations in the WLAN, causing key management issues.
• SSID: Since SSID is usually provided in the message header and transmitted as clear texts, it provides little security.
• WEP Key Vulnerability: Many concerns have been raised regarding the usefulness of WEP in securing 802.11 WLANs. Some of them are as follow:
a. Manual Key Management -Keys need to be entered manually on all the clients and access points. Such overhead may result in infrequently changed WEP keys.
b. Key Size -The IEEE 802.11 design community blames 40-bit RC4 keys for the WEP vulnerability, and recommends using 104 or 128-bit RC4 keys instead. Although using larger key size does increase the work of an intruder, it does not provide completely secure solution [8] .
c. Initialization Vector (IV) -IV is used to avoid encrypting two identical plain texts with the same key stream and thus result in the same cipher text. By combining a randomly generated IV with the key, the probability of two identical plain texts being encrypted into identical cipher texts is minimized. In WEP encryption the secret WEP key is combined with a 24-bit IV to create the key. RC4 takes this key as input and generates a key sequence equal to the total length of the plain text plus the IV. The key sequence is then XOR'ed with the plain text and the IV to generate the cipher text. According to findings reported in [8] , the vulnerability of WEP roots from its initialization vector and not from its smaller key size. WEP is based on RC4 algorithm. Two frames that use the same IV almost certainly use the same secret key and key stream. Moreover, since the IV space is very small, repetition is guaranteed in busy networks.
d. Decryption Dictionaries -Infrequent re-keying and frames with same IV result in large collection of frames encrypted with same key streams. These are called decryption dictionaries [9] [10]. Therefore, even if the secret key is not known, more information is gathered about the unencrypted frames and may eventually lead to the exposure of the secret key.
With vulnerabilities outlined above, it is reasonable to assume that an 802.11 WLAN protected by WEP alone can be easily cracked by using readily available tools such as AirSnort and WEPCrack. Alternative security solutions are apparently needed.
Alternative Solutions for WLAN Security
In order to secure 802.11 WLANs for critical applications, several alternative solutions have been adopted. Some of the common solutions are discussed in this section, including Cisco's proprietary LEAP protocol, the SSL (Secure Socket Layer), the VPN (Virtual Private Network), the upcoming IEEE 802.11i protocol, and the WPA (Wi-fi Protected Access) protocol.
The Cisco LEAP Protocol
Cisco Lightweight EAP 5 supports mutual authentication between a client and a RADIUS As shown in Figure 4 , both the wireless client and the access point must be LEAP-enabled.
An authentication server, such as RADIUS, is present in the server network to provide authentication service to the remote user.
Cisco has addressed the above described WEP vulnerabilities with WEP enhancements, such as message integrity check (MIC) and per packet keying [11] . In addition, LEAP provides the following counter measures against WEP vulnerability in 802.11.
• Mutual Authentication between Client Station and Access Point: As described in section 4.2, the problem of Rogue Access Points can be attributed to the one-way, client-centered authentication between the client and the AP. LEAP requires two-way authentication, i.e., a client can also verify the identity of the AP before completing the connection.
• Distribution of WEP Keys on a Per-session Basis: As opposed to the static WEP keys in 802.11, LEAP supports dynamic session keys. Both the RADIUS Server and the client independently generate this key, so it is not transmitted through the air. An attacker posing as an authenticated client will not have access to the keying material and will not be able to replicate the session key, without which frames sent to and from the attacker will be dropped.
SSL (Secure Socket Layer)
SSL is an application level protocol that enables end-to-end security between two communicating processes. As shown in Figure 5 , in a WLAN environment, the SSL client runs on the wireless station and the SSL server runs on the target application or web server. Once a wireless client is communicating with an access point, a user is not able to access resources over the wireless connection until properly authenticated. This authentication is accomplished via the additional level of SSL security encryption. Once an SSL client is authenticated with an SSLenabled server, subsequent data transmissions between them are encrypted.
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Figure 5. Wireless Security via SSL
Being an application level protocol, SSL provides the system implementers selective authentication for some of the back-end applications or servers behind the access points. In comparison, most other wireless security solutions, including LEAP, VPN, 802.11i, and WPA, are network or lower level protocols, which typically enforce across-the-board implementation of secure access to the network behind the access point.
VPN (Virtual Private Network)
VPN technology provides the means to securely transmit data between two network devices over an insecure data transport medium [12] . VPN has been used successfully in wired networks, especially when using an insecure network, such as the Internet, as a communication medium.
The success of VPN in wired networks and the Internet have prompted developers and administrators to deploy VPN to secure WLANs. As shown in Figure 6 , when used to secure a WLAN, the VPN client software runs on the wireless client machine, while the VPN server runs on one of the back-end servers. An encrypted tunnel is formed between the VPN client and the VPN server, thus ensuring the confidential data transmission over the wireless network. • Authentication: A VPN server should authorize every user who logged on at a particular wireless station trying to connect to the WLAN using a VPN client. Thus authentication is user based instead of machine based.
• Encryption: VPN provides a secure tunnel on top of inherently insecure medium like the Internet. To provide another level of data confidentiality, the traffic passing through the tunnel is also encrypted.
• Data authentication: It guarantees that all traffic is from authenticated devices.
The IEEE 802.11i Protocol
As stated in a page 7 of IEEE 802.11i task group, "The purpose of Task Group I is to:
Enhance the current 802.11 MAC to provide improvements in security." To reach that purpose, the IEEE 802.11i Task Group proposed a new protocol called RSN, Robust Security Network.
Robust Security Network in 802.11i
RSN uses the IEEE 802.1x port-authentication standard to authenticate wireless devices to the network and to provide the dynamic keys it requires [13] . RSN consists of two basic sub- As shown in Figure 7 , the 802.11i protocol consists of three underlying protocols, organized into two layers. On the bottom layer are TKIP and CCMP, the Counter mode CBC-MAC protocol 8 . Both encryption protocols provide improved data integrity over WEP. CCMP is an AES-based protocol, chosen to replace the old RC4 protocol in future 802.11 devices. While TKIP is optional in 802.11i, CCMP is mandatory for anyone implementing 802.11i [16] . Sitting on top of TKIP and CCMP is the 802.1x protocol, which provides user-level authentication and encryption key distribution.
The IEEE 802.1x Protocol
IEEE 802.1x is a port-based authentication protocol, which may be used in wired or wireless networks. Figure 8 is an illustration of 802.1x used in a wireless network. There exist three different types of entities in a typical 802.1x network, including a supplicant, an authenticator, and an authentication server [17] . The authenticator is the port that enforces the authentication process and routes the traffic to the appropriate entities on the network. The supplicant is the port requesting access to the network. The authentication server authenticates the supplicant based on the supplied credentials, and is typically a separate entity on the wired side of the network, but could also reside directly in the authenticator. [16] To permit the EAP traffic before the authentication succeeds, a dual-port model is used in IEEE 802.1x specifications. In an unauthorized (uncontrolled) state, the port allows only DHCP and EAP traffic to pass through.
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Figure 8: IEEE 802.1x in 802.11 WLANs
When applied to 802.11, the 802.1x specification includes two main features: (1) logical ports and (2) key management [18] . In the rest of this section we first discuss these two features, followed by discussions of vulnerabilities unveiled by some researchers.
• Logical Ports: Unlike wired networks, wireless stations are not connected to the network by physical means. They must have some sort of association relation with an AP in order to use the WLAN. This association is established by allowing the clients and the AP to know each other's MAC address. This combination of MAC address of the AP and that of the station acts as a logical port. This then acts as a destination address in EAPOL protocol exchanges.
• Key Management: In IEEE 802.1x, key information is passed from an AP to a station using EAPOL-Key message. Keys are generated dynamically, at a per-session basis.
A typical configuration of a WLAN using IEEE 802.1x is shown in Figure 8 . The Supplicant is the wireless station, which authenticates with the Authentication Server by using EAPOL to communicate with the AP, which acts as the Authenticator. Messages are exchanged between the Supplicant and the Authenticator to establish the Supplicant's identity. The Authenticator then transfers the Supplicant's information to the Authentication Server using RADIUS. All communications between the Authentication Server and the Supplicant passes through the Authenticator using EAP over LAN (i.e., EAPOL) and EAP over RADIUS, respectively. This creates an end-to-end EAP conversation between the Supplicant and the Authentication Server.
Vulnerabilities of 802.11i
The design goal of IEEE 802.11i protocol is to achieve enhanced MAC level security by integrating the 802.1x protocol with 802. Figure 9 , an attacker can forge this packet to start the attack.
2) Session Hijacking
With IEEE 802.1x, RSN (Robust Security Network) association has to take place before any higher layer authentication. To understand how a session may be hijacked in 802.11i, let's refer to Figure 10 . 2) An attacker then sends a MAC-disassociate message using the AP's MAC address.
3) The valid supplicant will disassociate when receiving the MAC-disassociate message.
4) This causes the RSN state machine to transfer to the Un-Associated state. However, since this disassociate message was sent by the attacker (impersonating as the real access point), the real access point does not know about it. Thus the 802.11 state machine remains in Authenticated state for that particular client in the real AP.
5) The attacker then gains network access using the MAC address of the authenticated supplicant (which is disassociated by now).
The WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) Protocol
As anticipated by most Wi-Fi manufacturers, the forthcoming IEEE 802.11i protocol, currently still in draft mode, is the "ultimate" security mechanism for 802. WPA is designed to secure all versions of 802.11 devices, including 802.11b, 802.11a, and 802.11g, multi-band and multi-mode [21] . As a temporary solution prior to the ratification of the 802.11i standard, WPA is forward-compatible with the 802.11i specification, and is actually a subset of the current 802.11i draft, taking certain pieces of the 802.11i draft that are ready to bring to market today, such as its implementation of 802.1x and TKIP.
WPA offers two primary security enhancements over WEP: an improved data encryption, which was weak in WEP, and user authentication, which was largely missing in WEP [20] .
• Enhanced data encryption through TKIP: To address WEP's known vulnerabilities (as discussed in section 4.2), TKIP provides important data encryption enhancements including a 9 Wi-Fi Alliance: http://www.wifialliance.com/OpenSection/index.asp per-packet key mixing function, a message integrity check (MIC) nicknamed Michael, an extended initialization vector (IV) with sequencing rules, and a re-keying mechanism.
• Enterprise-level user authentication via 802.1x and EAP: To strengthen user authentication, WPA implements 802.1x and EAP. Similar to LEAP, WPA's user authentication framework uses a central authentication server, such as RADIUS, to authenticate each user before allowing them to connect to the network. It also supports mutual authentication to allow a user to authenticate an access point, in order to prevent rogue access points.
The main pieces of the 802.11i draft that are not included in Wi-Fi Protected Access are secure IBSS, secure fast handoff, secure de-authentication and disassociation, as well as enhanced encryption protocols such as AES-CCMP. [20] 
Summary
Following an introduction to WLAN, we give an overview of the various types of WLANs.
Vulnerabilities of WLANs and the IEEE 802.11 protocols are then discussed. That section is followed by a discussion of alternative security solutions that may be used to protect WLANs, including Cisco's LEAP, SSL, VPN, IEEE 802.11i, and WPA. It should be noted that the IEEE 802.11i protocols are yet to be standardized, and vulnerabilities discussed in this paper are associated with the current draft, which will be further revised.
An important issue related to WLANs is the potential impact a security measure may have upon the performance of a given WLAN. Performance of WLANs can be optimized by tweaking various factors like encryption methods, fragmentation threshold, and RTS/CTS, etc. It is also dependent upon external factors like distance, other devices operating in the same frequency range like microwave oven and cordless phones, etc. Readers interested in this line of work may refer to [22] .
